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European Banking Union arguably represents the most important step 
in European economic integration since the launch of Monetary Union. 
Little wonder, then, that this major deepening of integration sparked a 
lively academic debate and triggered an ever-growing number of 
publications from different disciplinary backgrounds.  
The first wave of publications on European Banking Union (BU) 
provided us with overviews on the legal changes; they discussed at 
length the economic rationale underpinning BU; and they traced the 
political dynamics of establishing BU discussing key explanatory 
factors (for overviews, see Binder and Gortsos 2015; Busch and 
Ferrarini 2015; Castañeda, Mayes and Wood 2015; Howarth and 
Quaglia 2013 & 2014). This literature reflected BU’s foundational 
phase between 2012 and 2014 when the major texts enshrining BU in 
law were negotiated and adopted. This special issue is located at the 
intersection of this first phase and a second stage of research covering 
different topics as regards to the functioning of BU. New research 
questions are triggered by the — so far still limited — experiences 
regarding BU’s implementation and current operation. Based on this 
empirical evidence, contributions to this second wave of BU-related 
research try to identify potentially dangerous lacunae and design faults, 
contributing to the ongoing reform debates. 
Two contributions in this special issue look back at the establishment 
of BU and major controversies and conflicts surrounding it, not the least 
between the two core member states of the euro area, Germany and 
France. Joachim Schild’s (2018) contribution looks at the protracted 
and conflict-ridden process of negotiations — notable for the absence 
of strong Franco-German leadership — that left important matters 
undecided: notably, European-level deposit insurance and a fiscal 
backstop for Banking Union. Germany and France, the key actors in 
BU negotiations, did not share a clear common purpose on any of the 
main elements of BU. Analyzing their divergent preferences sheds light 
on the origins of the often messy compromises and complicated 
institutional setups characterizing the current design of BU, including 
the decision-making process to resolve banks. 
Ioannnis Asimakopoulos’ (2018) contribution is also dedicated to the 
‘construction’ phase of BU as he looks at the use of international law 
— instead of EU law — in the establishment of the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF). He points to the legal implications of this political choice 
to make use of an international agreement (IGA) instead of Union law, 
and notably the weak enforceability of the arrangements on the SRF. 
The use of international law, successfully advocated by Germany, 
allowed the largest euro area member states — first and foremost 
Germany — to retain control both of the setup and the use of the SRF. 
Opting for an IGA for the provisions on the transfer of national funds 
to the SRF sidestepped the European Parliament and gave the largest 
national contributors to the fund a veto power during the negotiations. 
The same holds true for the future potential use of ESM funds for direct 
bank recapitalization in case the SRF resources turn out to be 
insufficient. According to Asimakopoulos (p. XX), this provides an 
example of ‘nationalised European Integration’ ‘since economically 
stronger countries can fully control and influence resolution procedures 
and structural measures taken in poorer countries for the sake of 
integration’ in case ESM conditionality applies. 
David Mayes (2018, p. XX) compares the current state of affairs in BU, 
that “reflects the political constraints and the path of history”, with a 
full-fledged optimum structure that might have emerged if BU 
designers had had the opportunity to start from scratch. He contrasts a 
comprehensive structure of a banking union, taking the US as an 
example, with the new European system with all its “omissions” and 
“inelegant features”. One key difference he identifies can be found in 
the key role the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
plays as a resolution agency with strong financial resources. There is no 
equivalent to be found in European Banking Union. Furthermore, 
Mayes points to the danger of the BU “breaking up rather than 
reinforcing the EU” (p. XX). This is due to the new fault lines between 
euro-ins and euro-outs as BU implies the exclusion of the most 
important financial centre in Europe: London. Risks to financial 
stability also stem from the SSM covering only banks and not all major 
financial institutions such as insurers and shadow banks the operation 
of which might undermine financial stability. In the narrower realm of 
BU, other lacunae can be identified. There is no regulation in place 
regarding the structure of banks in order to separate banking from 
trading activities following the recommendations of the Likkanen 
report; and the negotiations on a European Deposit Insurance system 
failed to make much progress (see also Donnelly 2018b; Howarth and 
Quaglia 2018). Meanwhile the Commission even dropped its legislative 
proposal addressing the first issue of stabilizing banks by protecting the 
deposit taking arm of banks and retail-banking from risk-taking in 
investment banking and market-making trading activities. 
Based on his assessment of risks and omissions in the BU’s design, 
Mayes presents an agenda of what needs to be done to move BU closer 
to a comprehensive structure. However, he notes his pessimism as 
regards to the willingness of politicians to embark on the road towards 
new reforms, without the incentive of an immediate crisis. Hence, the 
“vulnerabilities from the incomplete union and the untested tools will 
remain” (Mayes 2018, p. XX). 
Zdenek Krudna and Sonja Puntscher Riekmann (2018) analyze the 
number of national options and discretions (O&Ds) in transposing and 
applying the new rules enshrined in the EU’s single rule book that 
applies to the EU-28. These O&Ds provide a source of fragmentation 
as they allow a persistent level of regulatory differentiation in the Single 
Market. The ECB’s initiative to reduce O&Ds by way of harmonization 
launched in 2016 only applies to the significant banks under its direct 
supervision. This intended reduction of O&Ds for significant banks 
under ECB supervision will add a twenty-ninth regulatory regime on 
top of the 28 different national regulatory regimes resulting from the 
differentiated use of national O&Ds by EU member states. 
The authors show that there is a systematic differentiation between the 
advanced market economies of the EU-15 and the emerging markets of 
the new post-communist member states. The latter try to stabilize their 
banking systems, heavily relying on foreign capital, by using available 
options and discretions to protect capital and liquidity in local 
subsidiaries of foreign banking groups under their host supervision. 
These differences notwithstanding, the authors are relatively optimistic 
with regard to the prospects for O&D harmonizing reforms inside 
Banking Union. 
Shawn Donnelly’s (2018a) contribution evaluates first experiences with 
the implementation of rules and the working of new institutions, taking 
the example of bank bail-outs in Italy and Portugal to avoid resolution 
using the new bail-in tool. His contribution sheds light on a weak spot 
of Banking Union, specifically the possibility open to member states — 
here Italy and Portugal — to circumvent the application of bail-in rules 
and instead continue to bail out banks using taxpayers’ money. 
Donnelly underlines the leeway available to member states and their 
competent national authorities to bail out national banks and to keep 
them under national control and ownership. They can also count on an 
accommodating stance of the Commission. This stance has, according 
to Donnelly, far reaching consequences as it “means fewer resolutions 
than originally envisaged, continued state aid and poor prospects for a 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) with full supranational powers” 
(p.XX). The available evidence so far as to how the Commission 
applied the rules when it allowed the Italian and Portuguese 
governments to bail out troubled banks testifies to a roll back of the 
agreed principle of bailing-in private investors. Hence, the “doom loop 
between banks and sovereigns persists” in Italy and Portugal (Donnelly 
2018a, p. XX). 
Taken together, the contributions to this special issue provide us with a 
nuanced picture of Banking Union’s construction problems, lacunae, 
and governance structure design faults. Banking Union resembles an 
unfinished cathedral. Given its problematic architecture, there remain 
important stability risks. 
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